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Automatic imitation tasks measuring motor priming effects showed that we directly map
observed actions of other agents onto our own motor repertoire (direct matching). A
recent joint action study using a social dual-task paradigm provided evidence for task
monitoring. In the present study, we aimed to test (a) if automatic imitation is disturbed
during joint action and (b) if task monitoring is content or time dependent. We used a social
dual-task that was made of an automatic imitation task (Person 1: Task 1) and a two-choice
number task (Person 2: Task 2). Each participant performed one of the two tasks, which
were given with a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), in an individual and a joint
condition. We found a regular motor priming effect in individual and joint conditions. Under
joint conditions, we replicated the previous finding of an increase of reaction times for
Person 2 with decreasing SOA. The latter effect was not related to the specific responses
performed by both persons. Further, we did not find evidence for a representation of the
other’s specific S-R mappings. Our findings suggest that (a) automatic imitation is not
disturbed during joint action and (b) task monitoring is time dependent.
Keywords: joint action, social cognition, social PRP, dual-task
INTRODUCTION
When somebody performs two tasks at the same time perfor-
mance either in one (Pashler and Johnston, 1989) or both of
the tasks (Tombu and Jolicoeur, 2004) is reduced, because the
cognitive system has only a limited amount of capacity for infor-
mation processing. When Task 1 is prioritized, reaction times
in Task 2 increase with decreasing Stimulus Onset Asynchrony
(SOA) between the tasks (Telford, 1931; Welford, 1952). This is
known as the psychological refractory period (PRP). The PRP
effect is often explained as a capacity limit either by an inherent
structural (Pashler, 1984, 1994) or a voluntary strategic (Meyer
and Kieras, 1997a; Schumacher et al., 2001) bottleneck. More
recent approaches also discuss the role of crosstalk between the
two responses, linking the PRP to spatially mediated response-
response (R-R) compatibility effects (e.g., Hommel, 1998; Lien
and Proctor, 2000; Schubert et al., 2008; Liepelt et al., 2011a). This
response-response crosstalk helps to reduce dual-task costs under
compatible R-R conditions (e.g., left-left), but hinders dual-task
cost reduction under incompatible conditions (e.g., left-right).
When two individuals share a task the performance of one
sometimes depends on the actions of the other. This has been
shown in studies on multi person action coordination. This
research originated from experiments on action observation.
Action observation activates brain areas that are involved in
motor preparation and execution of one’s own action (Gallese
et al., 1996; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Buccino et al., 2001; Fogassi
et al., 2005). Behavioral and neuroscientific work on automatic
imitation (Brass et al., 2000; Liepelt et al., 2008a) and action
understanding (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Liepelt et al., 2008b) suggests
that action observation automatically activates an internal action
simulation process (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Graf et al.,
2007) in the observer that can be used to predict others actions
(Springer et al., 2011; Stadler et al., 2011) and to understand
their goal states (Liepelt et al., 2010). Taken together, this leads
to the assumption that people directly map observed actions of
other agents onto their own motor repertoire (direct matching
hypothesis, Iacoboni et al., 1999). Direct matching can be studied
with an automatic imitation paradigm (Brass and Heyes, 2005)
in which participants carry out simple finger-lifting movements
while observing congruent or incongruent finger movements on
the screen. For example, if participants have to lift their finger in
response to a symbolic number cue (“1” or “2”) while observing
a task-irrelevant finger-lifting movement of another person their
action is facilitated if themovement is congruent and slowed-down
if it is incongruent (Brass et al., 2000; Bertenthal et al., 2006). The
difference in reaction times between congruent and incongruent
conditions is termed motor priming effect (Liepelt and Brass,
2010a,b). Here social cognitive processes are investigated in a
single individual observing another person’s action. In contrast,
joint action has been defined as any form of social interaction
where two or more individuals coordinate their actions in space
and time to bring about a change in the environment (Sebanz
et al., 2006). Joint action requires a close match of externally
and internally triggered action representations, which are also
supposed to bemediated by internal real-time simulation (Sebanz
and Knoblich, 2009), action prediction (Schubotz, 2007; Springer
et al., 2011) and a fine tuned action coordination process aligning
dyadic actions in space and time (Sebanz et al., 2005, 2006).
When two individuals share two tasks, the combination and
distribution of the tasks may induce processing bottlenecks
between the two subjects. Indeed, joint action coordination in
a social version of the dual-task paradigm (Liepelt and Prinz,
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2011) induces bottleneck-like processing when two individuals
share two complex and relatively independent numbermagnitude
tasks. Participants had to indicate whether two numbers (1–4 and
6–9) appearing one above the other were smaller or larger than
five. As in the standard PRP research, number stimuli were pre-
sented with a variable SOA so that the upper number (Stimulus
for Person 1 sitting on the left side) mostly appeared earlier in
time than the lower number (Stimulus for Person 2 sitting on the
right side). The dual-task was distributed between two people so
that each person responded to only one of the numbers. When
the instructions prioritized Task 1 processing reaction times of
Person 2 (Task 2) mimicked the standard PRP effect typically
observed when one person has to perform both tasks simulta-
neously. Because reaction times for Person 2 also increased with
decreasing SOA (social PRP effect), Liepelt and Prinz (2011)
interpreted this finding as evidence for a strategic task monitor-
ing effect that is related to the given task requirements (Meyer and
Kieras, 1997b).
In the present manuscript, we investigate two central ques-
tions that originate from this research. First, we ask whether direct
matching occurs when two persons are engaged in joint action or
whether joint action poses additional demands on our cognitive
system so that direct matching is disturbed. The former should
be expected, when direct matching previously found in auto-
matic imitation research (Brass et al., 2000; Liepelt et al., 2010) is
also present during joint action (Sebanz et al., 2003; Sebanz and
Knoblich, 2009). The second question concerns the exact nature
of the task monitoring effect in the social dual-task paradigm.
We ask whether task monitoring is task-content specific (i.e., spe-
cific to the action produced by both co-actors or specific to the
S-R mappings of both co-actors), or whether task monitoring is
related to the time at which the action effect is produced.
Aiming to answer these two questions, we combined an auto-
matic imitation paradigm (Brass et al., 2000) and a social dual-
task paradigm (Liepelt and Prinz, 2011). For the dual-task, we
used an automatic imitation task as Task 1 and a two-choice
number task as Task 2. We presented stimuli in two dimen-
sions: For the automatic imitation task, we presented a human
hand stimulus (Brass et al., 2000) depicting a finger-lifting move-
ment of either the left index or middle finger (Stimulus 1, S1)
shown from a third person perspective. For the two-choice num-
ber task, we presented a number stimulus (digit 1 or 2; Stimulus
2, S2) presented between the two moving fingers of the hand
stimulus (Figure 1A,B). S1 and S2 were given with a variable
SOA. Each participant was responsible for one part of the dual-
task, only. Person 1 performed index or middle finger-lifting
movements (Response 1, R1) in response to the moving hand
stimulus either in an imitative or counter-imitative way (Task 1).
Person 2 responded to the number stimulus by lifting the index
finger when the number 1 appeared, and the middle finger
when number 2 appeared (Response 2, R2) representing Task 2
(Figure 1A,B). Participants performed their part of the dual-
task alone (individual condition, Figure 1B) and together with a
partner who took over the other part of the dual-task (joint con-
dition, Figure 1A). In the joint condition priority was given on
Task 1 and task order was explicitly instructed. Both participants
responded with finger-lifting movements of their right hand.
For the present social dual-task situation, we had the follow-
ing predictions for automatic imitation and output monitoring.
If both persons (Person 1 and Person 2) directly match the finger-
lifting action on the screen (representing the stimulus for Task 1)
on their own action repertoire, one would predict a motor prim-
ing effect for Person 1 (Task 1), as well as a motor priming effect
for Person 2 (Task 2). These motor priming effects should be
present in the individual and in the joint condition, if joint-task
processing does not disturb direct matching. In both conditions,
this effect is expected at the shortest SOA condition where the
observation-execution overlap is strongest.
Output monitoring assumes that the second person acting
on the second task monitors the action effects of the first per-
son’s task that commences earlier in time. If the social PRP effect
(Liepelt and Prinz, 2011) is due to strategic action effect moni-
toring, one would predict an increase of reaction times for Task 2
(Person 2) in the joint condition when using a fixed task order
and a priority instruction on Task 1 processing. This effect should
be larger than in the individual condition where no action effect
monitoring is supposed to take place. If action effect monitoring
takes place, one could also expect a complete transfer of the S1-R1
compatibility effect (motor priming effect in Task 1, Person 1) to
the reaction times of Task 2 (Person 2) at the zero SOA condition.
This action effect monitoring may either be content spe-
cific or time dependent. If both persons do not only supervise
when the other person responds (time dependent action effect
monitoring), but also which specific action the other person
performs (content specific action effect monitoring), one would
predict that the second person responds faster in the joint condi-
tion of Task 2 when activating the spatially (and anatomically)
identical finger response as the first person in Task 1 (e.g.,
index-index), who acts ahead in time, as when both persons acti-
vate spatially (and anatomically) different finger responses (e.g.,
index-middle). We will use the term response-response crosstalk
(Schubert et al., 2008) for the latter kind of relation. This effect
would reflect the content of the specific responses given by the
other person. Content specificity may, however, also refer to more
than just the simple action or action effect produced by the other
person. The content may also include the specific task rule for
the other person, i.e., with which S-R mappings the other per-
son responds. A monitoring of the exact task rule may predict
that the S1-R2 compatibility effect (the motor priming effect for
Person 2) is larger when Person 1 responds imitatively, as when
he responds counter-imitatively to the hand stimulus. However,
if action effect monitoring is time dependent (and not content
dependent), one would not predict a speed up of reaction times
in Task 2 (Person 2) of the joint condition when both persons
sharing the dual-task activate the same finger responses and no
effect of task rule of the other person on the motor priming effect
of Person 2.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-two participants took part in the experiment (Mean age =
26.3 years, SD = 6.0 years; 19 female; 29 right-handed). All of
them participated in the individual condition as well as in the
joint condition. Half of the participants were randomly assigned
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup. Each participant performed one part of a
dual-task. Person 1 (acting on Task 1) sitting on the left side had to execute
finger-lifting movements (R1) with his right index or middle finger in response
to a hand stimulus (S1). Person 2 (acting on Task 2) sitting on the right side
had to respond with his right index or middle finger (R2) in response to a
number stimulus (S2). (A) Both individuals perform their part of the dual-task
together (joint condition). (B) One individual (Person 2) performs his part of
the dual-task alone (individual condition).
to Task 1 and the other half to Task 2. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naive with regard to the
hypotheses of the experiment. Each participant was paid C7 or
student credit points for participation. Participants gave their
informed consent to participate. The experiment was conducted
in accordance with the standards of the ethics committee of the
University of Münster and the ethical standards laid down in the
1975 Declaration of Helsinki.
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APPARATUS AND STIMULI
The experiment was conducted in a sound-attenuated and dimly
lit room. The stimuli were displayed on a 17-in color monitor
that was connected to a Pentium I PC. For stimulus presentation
we used ERTS software (Experimental Runtime System; Beringer,
2000).
As stimuli, we used short sequences of finger movements and
number stimuli (digit 1 or 2). The sequence of finger movements
(adapted from Brass et al., 2000) consisted of two frames pro-
ducing the impression of a finger-lifting movement showing a
hand from a third person perspective. The hand was presented
at the center of the monitor. The first frame showed a left human
hand in a resting position. The second frame showed the same
hand with either a lifted index or middle finger. As all partici-
pants responded with their right hand, the hand on the screen
mirrored both participants’ response hands. The number stim-
ulus, a black digit (1 or 2) displayed on a light-colored squared
background, appeared between the index and middle finger of
the hand stimulus. At a viewing distance of 80 cm, the ani-
mated hand subtended a visual angle of approximately 11.8◦ ×
7.4◦. The number stimulus had a visual angle of approximately
0.64◦ × 0.72◦.
Reaction times (RTs) were recorded with an optical response
device, which detected the initiation of the finger-lifting move-
ment of both participants. The device was equipped with four
optical sensors, which participants covered with the index and
middle finger of their right hands.
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
Each participant was responsible for one part of the dual-task,
only. Participants performed their part of the dual-task alone
(individual condition, Figure 1B) and together with a partner
who took over the other part of the dual-task (joint condi-
tion, Figure 1A). We used a within-subjects design, i.e., all sub-
jects participated in the joint and in the individual condition.
The order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants
(Figure 2).
Person 1 responded to the observed finger movement (Task 1).
Person 2 responded to the number stimulus (Task 2). Both par-
ticipants reacted by lifting either the index finger or the middle
finger of their right hand. Each condition was split into two
blocks. In one of the two blocks, Person 1 responded in an
imitative (S1–R1 compatible) way to the observed finger move-
ment (i.e., lifting the index finger, when the observed hand lifted
the index finger; lifting the middle finger, when the hand lifted
the middle finger). In the other block, Person 1 responded in
a counter-imitative (S1–R1 incompatible) way to the observed
finger movement (Figure 2). The S1-R1 compatibility indicat-
ing the relationship between the perceived hand stimulus (S1)
and the executed response finger of Person 1 (R1) was kept con-
stant within one block and varied block wise. In half of the
pairs, the respective Person 1 started with the imitative block,
in the other half of pairs, Person 1 started with the counter-
imitative block, so that the order of blocks was counterbalanced
across participants. In contrast, the task of Person 2 was the
same throughout the entire experiment. In both blocks of each
condition (joint and individual condition), Person 2 responded
FIGURE 2 | Schematic illustration of the experimental design used in
the present study. Thirty-two participants were randomly assigned to
one part of a dual-task. Person 1 (Task 1) responded to finger-lifting
movements of a hand stimulus (S1) either in an imitative or counter-
imitative way, the order of which was counterbalanced block wise
across participants. Person 2 (Task 2) responded to a number
stimulus (S2) presented between the moving fingers of the hand stimulus.
Person 2 always responded with a fixed S(timulus)-R(esponse) mapping
by lifting the index finger for digit 1 and lifting the middle finger for digit 2.
Both tasks were performed in a joint and in an individual condition.
The order of conditions was also counterbalanced across
participants.
with a fixed S-R mapping by lifting the index finger when the
digit 1 appeared on the screen, and by lifting the middle finger
when the digit 2 appeared (Figure 2). S1-R2 compatibility for
Person 2 (i.e., the compatibility between the hand stimulus, S1,
and the response of Person 2, R2) varied within each block, and
was based on the combination of the presented number stimulus
and the displayed finger-lifting response, respectively. This could
result either in an automatic imitative response (S1-R2 compat-
ible trial) or a counter-imitative response (S1-R2 incompatible
trial).
In the joint condition participants were instructed to give pri-
ority to Task 1 (Pashler, 1994; Liepelt and Prinz, 2011) inducing a
specific response order. We explicitly instructed Person 2 to wait
with the response to the number stimulus until the response of
Person 1 was completed. This was done to specifically test for
output monitoring as a possible basis of the social PRP effect
observed in previous studies. Person 1 was instructed to respond
directly after the finger-lifting movement was displayed on the
screen. In all conditions, all participants were encouraged to
respond as quickly and accurately as possible.
For each participant the sitting position was kept constant in
both conditions: Person 1 performing Task 1 was always seated on
the left side of the monitor, whereas Person 2 performing Task 2
was always seated on the right side. In the joint condition, partic-
ipants were seated next to each other, in the individual condition
an empty chair remained beside the participant.
Each trial began with the presentation of the resting hand for
800ms. Afterwards the hand lifted either the index or middle
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finger for 1400ms. With a variable SOA of 0, 100, 300, or 1000ms
after finger movement onset, the number stimulus (digit 1 or 2)
appeared and stayed on the screen together with the hand stimu-
lus for 1400ms. Following correct responses, the screen remained
blank. If no response was given in this time interval, the feedback
“zu langsam” (too slow) was presented. In the case of an incorrect
response, error feedback “Fehler” (error) was provided. All feed-
backs (blank, too slow, or error) were displayed for 300ms. After
the feedback, a constant inter-trial interval was given for 2100ms.
The total trial duration amounted to 4600ms plus SOA. To con-
trol for perceptual differences between conditions, we used the
same stimuli in individual and joint conditions.
The joint condition and the individual condition consisted
of 256 trials each. Both conditions were split into two blocks
of 128 trials (an imitative block and a counter-imitative block).
Participants had a short break between blocks and within each
block (after 64 trials). The order of trials was randomized within
each block. At the beginning of each condition (individual and
joint) participants were given 16 practice trials.
RESULTS
As a dependent measure RTs were analyzed using an analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with different factors specified below. Errors
(individual condition: Task 1: 1.9%, Task 2: 2.3%; joint condition:
Task 1: 2.7%, Task 2: 3.4%) or RTs shorter than 150ms or longer
than 1800ms (individual condition: Task 1: 0.02%, Task 2: 0.15%;
joint condition: Task 1: 0%, Task 2: 0%) were excluded from reac-
tion time analyses. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used to
assess the significance of each effect for all analyses.
MOTOR PRIMING EFFECTS
To analyze motor priming effects for Person 2 and Person 1, we
calculated a Two-Way ANOVA for the 0ms SOA, separately for
Task 2 and Task 1. The ANOVA included the within-subject fac-
tors condition (joint, individual) and compatibility (compatible,
incompatible) between the hand stimulus (S1) and each subject’s
response (R2 or R1).
Motor priming effect for task 2
A significant main effect of condition, F(1, 15) = 67.94, p <
0.001, partial η2 = 0.82, indicated slower overall RTs in the joint
condition (659ms) than in the individual condition (422ms). A
significant main effect of S1-R2 compatibility, F(1, 15) = 14.48,
p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.49, indicated faster RTs for S1-R2 com-
patible trials (529ms), as compared to S1-R2 incompatible trials
(552ms) confirming the presence of a motor priming effect for
Task 2. The magnitude of motor priming did not differ statis-
tically between the joint (18ms) and the individual condition
(27ms), as indicated by a non-significant interaction between
condition and S1-R2 compatibility, F < 1, partial η2 = 0.06.
Motor priming effect for task 1
A significant main effect of condition, F(1, 15) = 6.08, p < 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.29, indicated faster overall RTs in the joint
condition (357ms) than in the individual condition (376ms).
A significant main effect of S1-R1 compatibility, F(1, 15) = 57.96,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.79, indicated faster RTs for S1-R1 com-
patible trials (327ms), as compared to S1-R1 incompatible trials
(407ms) confirming the presence of a motor priming effect in
Task 1. The magnitude of motor priming did not differ statis-
tically between the joint (75ms) and the individual condition
(86ms), as indicated by a non-significant interaction between
condition and S1-R1 compatibility, F < 1, partial η2 = 0.06.
TESTING FOR ACTION EFFECT MONITORING
Social PRP effect
To investigate if there is a social PRP effect, we calculated an
ANOVA including the factors condition (joint, individual) and
SOA (0, 100, 300, 1000ms), both as within-subjects variables,
separately for Task 2 and Task 1.
Reaction time analysis for task 2. For Task 2, we found a signif-
icant main effect of condition, F(1, 15) = 57.24, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.79, indicating slower overall RTs in the joint condition
(539ms) as compared to the individual condition (409ms). A
significant main effect of SOA, F(3, 45) = 76.07, p < 0.001, par-
tial η2 = 0.84, indicated that RTs increased with decreasing SOA.
This effect was more pronounced in the joint than in the indi-
vidual condition (Figure 3A), as indicated by a significant inter-
action of condition × SOA, F(3, 45) = 52.25, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.78. Planned t-tests (Bonferroni corrected to α′ < 0.0125
for four comparisons) showed that the difference in RTs between
the joint and the individual condition was largest for the 0ms
SOA (238ms, p < 0.001), followed by the 100ms SOA (170ms,
p < 0.001), the 300ms SOA (79ms, p < 0.001), and the 1000ms
SOA (34ms, p < 0.001).
Reaction time analysis for task 1. For Task 1, we observed a sig-
nificant main effect of condition, F(1, 15) = 5.12, p < 0.05, partial
η2 = 0.25, indicating faster RTs in the joint condition (360ms)
as compared to the individual condition (376ms). There was no
significant main effect of SOA, F < 1, partial η2 = 0.06, and no
significant interaction of condition × SOA, F < 1, partial η2 =
0.05 (Figure 3B).
Transfer of task 1 motor priming on reaction times in task 2
To test whether motor priming in Task 1 affects reaction times
in Task 2, we calculated an ANOVA including the factors S1-R1
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and SOA (0, 100, 300,
1000ms), both as within-subject variables, separately for Task 2
and Task 1 of the joint condition, as well as the interaction of S1-
R1 compatibility and task for the 0ms SOA.
Reaction time analysis for task 2. A significant main effect of
S1-R1 compatibility, F(1, 15) = 8.01, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.35,
indicated faster RTs in Task 2 for compatible trials (521ms) as
compared to incompatible trials (560ms). A significant main
effect of SOA, F(3, 45) = 70.68, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.83, indi-
cated slower RTs for shorter SOAs than for longer SOAs. The
size of the compatibility effect was larger for shorter SOAs (59ms
for SOA 0ms, p < 0.025, Bonferroni corrected to α′ < 0.025 for
two comparisons) than for longer SOAs (8ms for SOA 1000ms,
p > 0.025), as indicated by a significant interaction of SOA ×
S1-R1 compatibility, F(3, 45) = 6.86, p < 0.01, partial η2 = 0.31
(Figure 4A).
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FIGURE 3 | Effects of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on reaction times of Task 2 (A) and Task 1 (B), separately for the joint (solid lines) and
individual (dashed lines) condition.
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FIGURE 4 | Effects of stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on reaction times of Task 2 (A) and Task 1 (B) of the joint condition for
S(timulus)1-R(esponse)1 compatible trials (black solid lines) and S1-R1 incompatible trials (gray solid lines).
Reaction time analysis for task 1. A significant main effect of
S1-R1 compatibility in task 1, F(1, 15) = 66.76, p < 0.001, partial
η2 = 0.82, indicated that RTs were faster for compatible tri-
als (321ms) compared to incompatible trials (402ms). A non-
significant effect of SOA indicated that RTs did not differ for
different SOAs, F(3, 45) = 1.41, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.09. The
interaction of SOA × S1-R1 compatibility was also not signifi-
cant, F(3, 45) = 2.16, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.13 (Figure 4B).
The interaction between S1-R1 compatibility × task was not
significant, F < 1, partial η2 = 0.02, indicating a statistically
comparable S1-R1 compatibility effect for Task 1 (75ms) and
Task 2 (59ms) for the 0ms SOA.
TESTING TIME VERSUS CONTENT SPECIFIC ACTION EFFECT
MONITORING
Response content specific action effect monitoring
We analyzed RTs for Task 2 of the joint condition using an
ANOVA including the factors R1-R2 compatibility (compatible,
incompatible) and SOA (0, 100, 300, 1000ms) to test if action
effect monitoring depends on the correspondence of the specific
finger responses jointly activated in both participants. A signifi-
cant main effect of SOA, F(3, 45) = 68.98, p < 0.001, partial η2 =
0.82, indicated larger RTs for shorter SOAs. The main effect of
R1-R2 compatibility was not significant, F(1, 15) = 2.16, p > 0.05,
partial η2 = 0.13, indicating that response-response crosstalk
across both participants did not take place during joint task
performance. We observed no significant interaction of SOA ×
R1-R2 compatibility, F(3, 45) = 2.77, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.16
(Table 1).
Monitoring of task rules
To investigate whether the second person monitors the task rule
of Person 1, we conducted an ANOVA including the factors S1-R2
compatibility (compatible, incompatible) and S1-R1 compatibil-
ity (compatible, incompatible), both as within-subjects variables,
for RTs in Task 2 for the 0ms SOA of the joint condition.
We observed a significant main effect of S1-R1 compatibility,
F(1, 15) = 8.29, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.36, and a marginally
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Table 1 | Reaction times in milliseconds (ms) of Task 2 of the joint
condition for R(esponse)1-R(esponse)2 compatible trials and R1-R2
incompatible trials for different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs).
R1-R2 compatible R1-R2 incompatible
SOA 0 657 661
SOA 100 586 568
SOA 300 486 490
SOA 1000 438 430
significant main effect of S1-R2 compatibility, F(1, 15) = 3.50, p <
0.10, partial η2 = 0.19 (note that only trials of the 0ms SOA of
the joint condition were included in the present analyses), indi-
cating faster RTs for compatible trials than for incompatible trials.
We observed no interaction of S1-R1 compatibility× S1-R2 com-
patibility, F < 1, partial η2 = 0.03, indicating that the size of
S1-R2 compatibility effect was not modulated by S1-R1 compat-
ibility. The S1-R2 compatibility effect for S1-R1 compatible trials
amounted to 22ms and the S1-R2 compatibility effect for S1-R1
incompatible trials amounted to 12ms.
DISCUSSION
The present study combined an automatic imitation task and a
social dual-task paradigm to test if automatic imitation effects
break down during joint action. Further, we aimed to test if task
monitoring is time or content dependent.
In line with previous studies from action observation (Calvo-
Merino et al., 2005) and imitation research (Brass et al., 2000;
Iacoboni et al., 2005), we observed a motor priming effect
based on the correspondence between the observed and executed
actions for Person 1 and for Person 2 in the individual condi-
tion. Extending these findings, we also observed motor priming
effects for both persons during active engagement in joint action.
These findings suggest that direct matching is not overridden
by the active engagement of two persons during joint dual-task
processing.
Further, we observed an increase of reaction times with
decreasing SOA for the joint condition replicating the finding of
a social PRP effect with realistic hand stimuli. The social PRP
effect seems, therefore, not to be restricted to fully overlapping
task sets and abstract number categorization tasks, as present in
Liepelt and Prinz (2011). For the zero SOA condition, we further
observed a full transfer of the S1-R1 compatibility effect to the
reaction times of Person 2. As the task setting we used forced
Person 2 to supervise the action effects produced by Person 1
and the delay of reaction times in Person’s 1 task was based on a
manipulation of the response selection stage in Task 1, we assume
that the transfer effect found for Person 2 is due to strategic action
effect monitoring.
As we did not find evidence for response-response crosstalk
across both persons during joint task processing, action effect
monitoring seems not to be related to the specific response given
by the other person. Further, motor priming for Person 2 was not
affected by the way Person 1 responded to the hand stimulus (imi-
tation vs. counter-imitation). This suggests that the present social
dual-task situation may also not require the co-representation of
the other’s specific S-R mappings (Sebanz et al., 2005). Taken
together, our findings suggest that the action effect monitoring
process we observed is related to the point in time when the
other person responds and may not be related to the specific
task-content.
The presence or expectation (Vlainic et al., 2010) of another
responding person represents a salient event that provides an
alternative for the actor’s own response (Guagnano et al., 2010;
Dolk et al., 2011). As Person 1 acts ahead in time, a slight head
start may even increase the saliency of the response given by this
person. One may speculate that the difficulty to distinguish the
cognitive representation of one’s own action from the represen-
tation of the others action (Dolk et al., 2011; Liepelt et al., in
press) increases, the more the time interval between both stimuli
decreases rendering the effects of joint task performance partic-
ularly strong at the shorter SOAs. Person 2 may run some inner
time clock, monitoring the production of the first person’s action
effects.
Action effect monitoring may also be relevant in real life. For
example, when two football players supervise the other person’s
action effects before starting their own run in order to properly
achieve joint goal states. What is needed for a successful goal
achievement is an effective resource allocation process in space
and time (Vygotsky, 1978; Meyer and Kieras, 1997b) that allows
smooth inter-personal action (Sebanz et al., 2006) and inter-task
coordination (Liepelt et al., 2011b). While the present findings
tap the process of allocation of resources with respect to time,
other studies investigating joint action within the spatial domain,
such as the Social Simon effect (Sebanz et al., 2003; Liepelt et al.,
2011c), may tap the allocation of resources in space.
A possible concern regarding the present findings is that a
monitoring of the exact S-R mappings of the other co-actor is
not needed to succeed in joint task performance in our study. The
effects of content specific task monitoring may, therefore, only be
found in the present task situation when task monitoring would
be a fully automatic process, which seems not to be the case. A task
situation that would force both participants to activate the other
person’s S-R mappings, as for example by relating the response of
Person 2 more specifically to the task-content of Person 1, may,
therefore, provide evidence for content specific task monitoring
effects. We think that this would be an interesting way to go in
future research since such a social setting seems to occur quite
often in real life.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, our findings suggest that direct matching is not
disturbed during joint action. Action effect monitoring in the
present version of the social dual-task seems to be time dependent.
The assumption that we represent the exact S-R mappings of the
co-actor is not necessary to explain the observed social PRP effect.
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